The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong by Rudin, Joel B.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 2 Article 5 
November 2011 
The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be 
Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that 
Prove that Assumption Wrong 
Joel B. Rudin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the 
Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 537 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss2/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 537 
THE SUPREME COURT ASSUMES ERRANT 
PROSECUTORS WILL BE DISCIPLINED BY THEIR 
OFFICES OR THE BAR:  THREE CASE STUDIES 
THAT PROVE THAT ASSUMPTION WRONG 
Joel B. Rudin*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 19831 creates a civil damages remedy against “every state 
official for the violation of any person’s federal constitutional or statutory 
rights.”2  Under § 1983, citizens are empowered to act as “private attorneys 
general” to enforce the Constitution against individual governmental actors 
or municipalities.3  In Imbler v. Pachtman,4 the Supreme Court limited the 
use of this remedy against public prosecutors, finding that, like judges, they 
are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for conduct 
“within the scope of [prosecutors’] duties in initiating and pursuing a 
criminal prosecution.”5  Recognizing that its decision might “leave the 
genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor 
whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty,”6 the Court 
reasoned that “the immunity of prosecutors from liability . . . under § 1983 
does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or punish that 
which occurs”7 because “a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among 
officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his 
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.”8
 
*  Joel B. Rudin is a New York criminal defense and plaintiff’s civil rights attorney who has 
handled several of the leading cases in New York involving individual and municipal civil 
liability for Brady and other due process violations by prosecutors.  He is the recipient of the 
New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ 2011 Justice Thurgood S. 
Marshall Award as outstanding criminal defense practitioner.  An associate in his law office, 
Terri S. Rosenblatt, provided invaluable assistance in the research and drafting of this article. 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 2. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997). 
 3. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (bringing claim against 
municipality alleging that police officer’s failure to provide plaintiff necessary medical 
attention while in police custody violated her constitutional rights); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (bringing suit against the City of New York and other 
governmental actors arguing that forced maternity leave violates constitutional rights). 
 4. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 5. Id. at 410. 
 6. Id. at 427. 
 7. Id. at 428–29. 
 8. Id. at 429. 
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Imbler foreclosed a significant avenue for wronged criminal defendants 
to obtain redress, but it did not preclude all potential theories of civil 
liability against prosecutors and their offices under § 1983.  
Notwithstanding Imbler, a prosecutor may be sued for his or her conduct in 
an extra-judicial or “investigative” capacity.9  Additionally, under Monell v. 
Department of Social Services of New York10 and City of Canton v. 
Harris,11 a municipality may be sued where the unlawful custom, policy, or 
practice of its prosecutor’s office causes constitutional injury to the 
plaintiff.12  Such an “unlawful policy” may be proven by showing that a 
municipality is deliberately indifferent13 to its constitutional obligations 
through its failure to train, supervise, or discipline its agents or 
employees.14
Both of these paths to prosecutorial accountability are under attack in the 
courts.  With anecdotal evidence suggesting a recent upswing in multi-
million dollar lawsuits filed against prosecutors’ offices,
 
15 the Supreme 
Court recently has granted certiorari in a number of cases brought against 
prosecutors individually or against the municipalities that employ them.16  
In its decision denying Monell liability in Connick v. Thompson17
 
 9. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–96 (1991) (holding that prosecutor is entitled 
only to “qualified immunity” for providing assistance to police that contributes to a 
misleading arrest warrant application intended to bring a suspect before the court for 
criminal proceedings); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129–31 (1997) (holding 
that only qualified immunity protects prosecutor who acted like a complainant in personally 
attesting to the truth of a fact necessary to obtain an arrest warrant); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 
509 U.S. 259, 269–70 (1993) (holding that only qualified immunity protects prosecutor who 
obtained a false expert opinion during a matter’s investigative stage for later use at a 
criminal trial). 
 on March 
29, 2011, the Court again relied on Imbler’s assumption that prosecutors 
will be deterred from committing misconduct due to their amenability to 
 10. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
 11. 489 U.S. 378, 398 (1989). 
 12. See, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.; see also Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 678, 695–96 (App. Div. 
2001). 
 15. See, e.g., Anahad O’Connor, $18 Million to Man Wrongly Imprisoned, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2010, at A22 (reporting on Newton v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 6211, 2010 WL 
4177383 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2010); this verdict was subsequently vacated after trial); A. G. 
Sulzberger, City to Pay Record $9.9 Million over Man’s Imprisonment, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2010, at A19 (reporting on Gibbs v. City of New York, 714 F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010)); Bruce Golding, ‘Wrong Man’ $30 M. Suit, N.Y. POST (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/wrong_man_suit_JY7gsJ4EK1HyVSfYWC
5V3J (reporting on Bermudez v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 750 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 3, 
2011)). 
 16. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360–63 (2011) (holding that municipal 
prosecutor’s office cannot be held liable under “failure to train” theory based on a “single 
incident” of a Brady violation); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (District 
Attorney has absolute immunity for policy concerning information-sharing with police); 
McGhee v. Pottawattamie Cnty., 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 
(Apr. 20, 2009), dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (Jan. 4, 2010) (considering whether prosecutor is 
immune from liability for manufacturing evidence; this case settled before a decision was 
entered). 
 17. 131 S. Ct. 1350. 
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“professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and 
disbarment.”18  This position has consistently been advocated by parties 
and their amici favoring the prosecutor’s side of the debate.19
This Article challenges that assumption based on information uncovered 
through the very types of Monell and individual liability lawsuits that 
prosecutors and municipalities seek to curtail.  A number of commentators 
and scholars already have found that, contrary to Imbler, the discipline of 
prosecutors rarely occurs.  They also have analyzed the existing 
mechanisms for internal and external prosecutorial oversight and found 
that, also contrary to Imbler, such mechanisms fail to provide an effective 
structure for prosecutorial accountability.  The information in these articles 
generally is drawn from publicly available data, or from voluntary 
responses by prosecutors’ offices to surveys or interviews.  This material is 
summarized below in Part I. 
 
However, the principal purpose of this Article is to present further 
evidence that prosecutors are rarely disciplined, and that prosecutors’ 
offices lack effective policies or structures for accountability, based upon 
material that their offices have been compelled to disclose during the course 
of civil rights lawsuits brought by the author.  These materials, presented 
below in the form of case studies, show that in at least three New York City 
District Attorneys’ Offices, Brady and related due process violations20 
committed by public prosecutors are tolerated by their respective offices, 
which almost never discipline or sanction offenders.  Deposition testimony 
as well as documentary discovery revealed that these District Attorneys’ 
Offices have no codes of conduct,21
 
 18. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363. 
 no formal disciplinary rules or 
 19. See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 13, 28, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 
(2011) (No. 09-571); Amicus Curiae Brief of the National District Attorneys Ass’n in 
Support of Petitioners at 10–11, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571); 
Brief of the National Ass’n of Assistant United States Attorneys & National District 
Attorneys Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support Of Petitioners at 8–17, Pottawattamie Cnty. v. 
McGhee, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009) (No. 08-1065); Brief of Petitioners at 36, Van de Kamp v. 
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (No. 07-854). 
 20. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (holding that prosecutors have an 
absolute constitutional due process obligation to turn over to defense counsel material 
information favorable to the defense).  The Brady rule includes material impeachment 
evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972).  Prosecutors also are 
obligated under the Due Process Clause to refrain from presenting false or misleading 
evidence, or making false or misleading arguments, to the jury. See United States v. 
Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 21. As this Article went to press, the District Attorneys Association of the State of New 
York released a new ethics handbook. See DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N OF THE STATE OF N.Y., 
“THE RIGHT THING”:  ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTORS (2011).  This handbook 
contains strong, generally progressive statements about specific ethical obligations of 
prosecutors, including the obligation to disclose Brady material pursuant to constitutional 
and ethical rules. Id.  It also includes a strong statement of potential consequences for 
prosecutors who act unethically, such as censure or written reprimand, termination, 
disbarment, and even criminal prosecution. Id. at 6–7.  However, the booklet makes no 
reference to any obligation of District Attorneys to adopt any formal or regular disciplinary 
procedures, to actually impose such discipline, or to refrain from ratifying misbehavior by 
defending it in the courts.  It remains to be seen whether the handbook’s exhortations will be 
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procedures, and no history of imposing sanctions or any other negative 
consequences on prosecutors who violate Brady or related due process rules 
intended to guarantee defendants the right to a fair trial.  To the contrary, 
they regularly defend such conduct no matter how strong the evidence that a 
violation occurred.  The evidence provided in these lawsuits shows that 
judicial disciplinary bodies virtually never punish prosecutors for violating 
ethics rules.22
Ironically, in one of the cases discussed below, a court’s disciplinary 
body suggested to a complainant that if he was not satisfied with the 
confidential “admonition” given to a prosecutor who had knowingly relied 
on false testimony to wrongfully imprison him, he could consult with 
counsel regarding “civil remedies.”
 
23
I.  COMMENTATOR AND COMMITTEE STUDIES OF PROFESSIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCIPLINE OF PROSECUTORS 
  When official attorney disciplinary 
bodies propose civil lawsuits as an alternative to the ineffectual attorney 
grievance process, it is time to question the Supreme Court’s assumption 
that such “discipline” is an effective deterrent to prosecutorial misconduct. 
Commentators and research committees have responded to the Supreme 
Court’s assumptions about the susceptibility of prosecutors to professional 
discipline by studying whether, in fact, such discipline actually occurs.  In 
reaching the consensus that “professional discipline of prosecutors is 
extremely rare,”24 legal commentators and other researchers have, among 
other things, reviewed published decisions of state bar disciplinary 
authorities and conducted voluntary surveys of prosecutors’ offices.  These 
published studies uniformly conclude that prosecutors are “rarely, if ever,” 
punished by professional disciplinary bodies, even when they engage in 
“egregious” misconduct.25
Richard A. Rosen, in 1987, surveyed all reported cases of attorney 
discipline in order to determine the proportion of those cases that involved 
the discipline of criminal prosecutors for violations of the Brady rule.
 
26
 
contradicted, as in the past, by official toleration of flagrant or intentional violations of the 
acknowledged rules. 
  He 
also surveyed numerous state bar and prosecutorial oversight committees to 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 24. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 
722 (2006). 
 25. Shelby A.D. Moore, Who Is Keeping the Gate?  What Do We Do when Prosecutors 
Breach the Ethical Responsibilities They Have Sworn to Uphold?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 
807 (2006); see also Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline 
Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 296 (2007) (terming the discipline received 
by the prosecutor in the “Duke lacrosse” case the “Mike Nifong exception” because the case 
represents a rare example of prosecutorial discipline); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful 
Convictions:  It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275, 276 
n.7 (2004) (citing BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 14.1 n.5 (2d ed. 
2002)). 
 26. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:  
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 718–20 (1987). 
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find unpublished or otherwise unreported instances where such discipline 
was imposed.27  He found only “nine cases . . . in which discipline was 
even considered,”28 and only six where it was actually imposed.29  Ten 
years later, Jeffrey Weeks updated Rosen’s study and found that, although 
there was no decrease in the amount of Brady violations committed, there 
were only seven additional instances where prosecutorial discipline was 
considered, and only four cases where it was actually imposed.30
In a similar study, Fred C. Zacharias reviewed every reported case of 
professional discipline for prosecutorial misconduct.
 
31  He found only 
twenty-seven instances32 in which prosecutors were disciplined for 
unethical behavior occurring at or affecting the fairness of criminal trials, 
including, but not limited to, violations of the Brady rule.33  Zacharias’s 
study compared this rate of discipline to that of all lawyers nationally and 
concluded that “prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the abstract and 
in comparison to private lawyers.”34
In connection with special investigative reports on the causes of wrongful 
convictions, committees of lawyers and other criminal justice professionals 
in New York and California examined whether prosecutors are disciplined 
by their own offices.  The New York State Bar Association Task Force on 
Wrongful Convictions (Task Force) examined fifty-three cases of wrongful 
convictions that were overturned by “exoneration,” and conducted hearings 
at which both defense attorneys and prosecutors testified.
 
35  It concluded 
that thirty-one of the wrongful convictions were attributable to 
“governmental practices,” which were defined to include the use of false 
testimony, violation of Brady, improper evidence retention or transfer, and 
refusal to investigate alternative suspects to crimes.  It reported that 
“research has not revealed any public disciplinary steps against 
prosecutors.”36
 
 27. See id. at 720. 
  The Task Force also surveyed District Attorneys’ Offices 
across New York State, twenty of which responded to a written 
questionnaire, to determine “whether sanctions [for prosecutorial 
misconduct] had ever been imposed,” and found that just one prosecutor 
 28. Id.; see also id. at 700–03 (collecting as an “example” more than fifty reported cases 
of prosecutorial misconduct related to Brady). 
 29. Id. at 720–31. 
 30. Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy:  The Effective Enforcement of the 
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 881 
(1997). 
 31. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 
743 (2001). 
 32. Id. at 751–54 tbls. VI & VII. 
 33. As opposed to “plainly illegal activity,” such as “bribery, extortion . . . and 
embezzlement,” or “allegedly abusive behavior towards tribunals, usually consisting of 
criticism of judges.” Id. at 744–47. 
 34. Id. at 755. 
 35. FINAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS 19, 29–31 (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/
NavigationMenu42/April42009HouseofDelegatesMeetingAgendaItems/FinalWrongfulConvi
ctionsReport.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 5, 17. 
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had been referred to an outside disciplinary committee by these offices, and 
only one prosecutor had been sanctioned internally.37  The Task Force also 
took and credited testimony from the author concerning his law firm’s 
findings as to internal discipline of prosecutors in New York City.38  The 
Task Force concluded, “[T]here is little or no risk to the specific 
[prosecutor] involved resulting from a failure to follow the [Brady] rule.”39
Meanwhile, in California, the Commission on the Fair Administration of 
Justice (Justice Commission) made similar findings.  The Justice 
Commission analyzed 2,131 California cases where criminal defendants 
raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct in trials, appeals, or post-
conviction litigation.
 
40  While courts had found prosecutorial misconduct in 
444 of these cases, the Justice Commission focused on fifty-four cases that 
resulted in the reversal of the conviction and which also, pursuant to a 
specific provision of California Law, should have been reported to the state 
bar association for disciplinary investigation.41  The Commission could not 
find a single instance where any such referral was made.42  The 
Commission concluded, “[O]ur reliance upon the State Bar as the primary 
disciplinary authority is seriously hampered by underreporting.”43  
Moreover, the Justice Commission cited no specific examples of internal 
discipline in those cases, or in any others.44
Finally, a study conducted by two journalists at the Chicago Tribune in 
1999 also investigated whether prosecutors’ offices disciplined their 
employees for prosecutorial misconduct.  Their articles reported that out of 
381 nationwide reversals in homicide cases (sixty-seven of which carried 
death sentences) since 1963 (the year Brady was decided) for “using false 
evidence or concealing evidence suggesting innocence,”
 
45 only “one 
[prosecutor] was fired, but [he] appealed and was reinstated with back 
pay,”46 “another received an in-house suspension of 30 days,” and a “third 
prosecutor’s law license was suspended for 59 days, but because of other 
misconduct in the case.”47  None were disbarred or received any public 
sanction.48
Scholars have noted that prosecutors’ offices generally lack sufficient 
internal mechanisms to oversee and discipline attorneys effectively.  As part 
 
 
 37. Id. at 30–31. 
 38. Id. at 31; see also infra Part II. 
 39. FINAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 29. 
 40. CAL. COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 71 (Gerald Uelmen ed., 
2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 73–74. 
 45. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error:  The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at C1. 
 46. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error:  The Verdict:  Dishonor, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at C1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
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of a Symposium at Cardozo Law School studying prosecutorial compliance 
with Brady and other discovery obligations,49 several commentators 
identified design flaws in prosecutors’ offices related to this lack of 
oversight.50  Elsewhere, commentators also have faulted prosecutors’ 
offices for failing to implement the type of rigorous organizational 
oversight models used in administrative agencies51 and corporations.52
The above research on prosecutorial discipline and internal supervisory 
policies, while contradicting the Imbler assumption about prosecutorial 
discipline, is limited by the lack of access to the internal records of 
prosecuting offices and to insider accounts of how such offices operate, as 
well as to the often secret disciplinary practices of judicial or bar grievance 
committees.  The next section presents such previously unavailable 
information as it relates to three large District Attorneys’ Offices in New 
York:  Bronx, Queens, and Kings (Brooklyn) Counties.  New York City 
was compelled by court orders in several Monell-based lawsuits to provide 
document discovery and deposition testimony concerning these Offices’ 
disciplinary procedures and practices.  The information that has been 
disclosed further refutes the Supreme Court’s assumptions in Imbler. 
  
Rather than being uniquely amenable to professional discipline, 
prosecutors’ offices appear far less equipped than other large organizations, 
including police departments, to manage and discipline employees. 
 
 49. See generally Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations:  What Really Works, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943 (2010). 
 50. See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2090–91 (2010) (explaining that prosecutors’ offices should take a 
more “compliance-based” approach to misconduct because “[t]he existing framework for 
addressing prosecutorial misconduct is entirely backward-looking, and ineffective”). See 
generally Voices from the Field:  An Inter-Professional Approach to Managing Critical 
Information, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2037 (2010) (collecting reports from medical 
professionals, police department officials, corporate psychologists, and statisticians about 
alternative models for ensuring prosecutorial accountability); Barry Scheck, Professional 
and Conviction Integrity Programs:  Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models 
for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2215–16 (2010) (proposing the creation of an 
external monitoring body to review dubious convictions). 
 51. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:  Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869–70 (2009) (addressing “design flaws” 
in the operation of prosecutors’ offices, which contribute to “prosecutorial overreaching”).  
Barkow criticizes the vertical structure of prosecutors’ offices, in which the same prosecutor 
investigating a case also prosecutes it. Id.  She recommends that prosecutors’ offices should 
follow the model of administrative agencies in separating officials handling investigations 
from those handling advocacy functions. Id. 
 52. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009) (“The resulting dangers [of the lack of prosecutorial 
accountability] can be enormous.”).  Bibas suggests that prosecutors’ offices would benefit 
from following a corporate model in five areas:  office culture; managerial structure; internal 
policy-making; personnel actions, such as hiring, firing, promotion, and training; and the 
dissemination of information, performance evaluations, and incentives.  Following a 
corporate structure would increase accountability of individual prosecutors, as well as of the 
local District or State Attorney.  Bibas posits that a more formalized and predictable training 
and disciplinary model would tamp down prosecutors who “suffer from an excess of 
adversarial zeal and a notches-on-the-belt conviction mentality.” Id. at 1000–11. 
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II.  CASE STUDIES:  THE DISCIPLINARY POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND 
HISTORY OF THREE NEW YORK CITY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES 
 A.  The Bronx District Attorney’s Office 
Alberto Ramos was a criminal defendant who was unjustly convicted of 
rape in 1985, freed upon the discovery of Brady violations in 1992, and 
recovered a $5 million civil rights settlement in 2003.  In furtherance of the 
civil rights suit, the author compelled the Bronx District Attorney’s Office 
to disclose personnel records for prosecutors involved in seventy-two cases 
in which courts had found improper behavior by prosecutors from 1975 
through 1996, and to submit to oral depositions about the Office’s 
“disciplinary” practices.  In subsequent companion lawsuits, which are 
ongoing, brought on behalf of two former criminal co-defendants 
victimized by Brady violations during an attempted murder trial in 1998, 
the author and his co-counsel53 have obtained additional records through 
2007, as well as the depositions of Robert T. Johnson, Bronx District 
Attorney since 1989, virtually all of his senior staff, and two line 
prosecutors.  These discovery materials have revealed that this major urban 
prosecutor’s office, employing nearly 400 prosecutors and hundreds of 
support staff,54
1.  The Ramos Case 
 has no published code or rules of behavior for prosecutors, 
no schedule of potential sanctions for misbehavior or objective standards 
governing when such sanctions will be imposed, no written or formal 
procedure for investigating or disciplining prosecutors, and no procedure 
for keeping a record of prosecutors who have been cited for or are known to 
have engaged in improper behavior.  Officials could identify just one 
prosecutor since 1975 who, according to the Office’s records, has been 
disciplined in any respect for misbehavior while prosecuting a criminal 
case.  Officials claim that several prosecutors have been verbally chastised, 
or temporarily denied raises in compensation, but there is no apparent 
record of it. 
a.  The Criminal Prosecution 
Alberto Ramos was a twenty-one-year-old college student and part-time 
childcare worker when he was arrested on September 6, 1984, and charged 
with raping a five-year-old girl at a Bronx day care center.  His arrest was 
the latest in a series of highly publicized day care center sexual abuse cases 
brought by then-District Attorney Mario Merola, a politically ambitious 
 
 53. Co-counsel is New York attorney Julia Kuan, who won the cases of each of the 
former criminal defendants who are now plaintiffs in the lawsuits. 
 54. Erin Einhorn & Jonathan Lemire, DAs Urge Council:  Save Us!, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
June 4, 2010, at 18 (explaining that the Bronx D.A.’s office is under pressure to fire forty-
five prosecutors). 
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prosecutor.55  In May 1985, Ramos’s case became the first of the Merola 
prosecutions to come to trial.56
The prosecution’s case was based upon the child’s sworn testimony 
claiming that she had been raped in a classroom bathroom while the other 
children were napping.
 
57  For “corroboration,” the People relied on a 
doctor’s testimony that the child’s mere ability to describe sexual 
intercourse indicated that she had experienced it, as well as the doctor’s 
observation that the child had a vaginal irritation or rash.58  In addition, the 
child’s grandmother testified that when she picked up the girl on the day in 
question, the child was upset.59  Other witnesses informed the jury that 
earlier that day, Ramos, exasperated by the children’s rowdiness and his 
inability to control them, had inappropriately placed tape on the upper lip of 
several children, including the complainant, to quiet them.60  In her 
summation, the prosecutor forcefully argued that the child could not “make 
up” her claim of having sexual intercourse and that her vaginal “bruises” 
corroborated her testimony.61
Ramos was convicted.  He screamed in agony, “Kill me.”
 
62   Several 
weeks later, the judge, expressing frustration that he could not sentence 
Ramos to life in prison, meted out the maximum sentence of eight and one- 
third to twenty-five years.63  Ramos’s direct appeal and his post-judgment 
motion to vacate his conviction were denied.64  Because he continued to 
deny his guilt, Ramos was likely to serve at least two-thirds, if not the 
entirety, of his maximum sentence.65  Meanwhile, the everyday reality of 
his punishment was brutal:  as a convicted child rapist, he was subjected to 
constant physical, sexual, and verbal abuse.66
Seven years into Ramos’s hellish incarceration, fate intervened.  The 
alleged victim’s mother had brought a civil lawsuit against the New York 
City-funded day care center and against Ramos.  The City’s private 
 
 
 55. See Frontline:  Innocence Lost:  Other Well-Known Cases, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/innocence/etc/other.html (last visited Oct. 
20, 2011) (describing Merola’s prosecution of the “Bronx Five” day care center workers). 
 56. See Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 678, 684 (App. Div. 2001). 
 57. STEPHEN GILLERS, IN THE PINK ROOM 2–3 (2006). 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 3–4; see also Trial Transcript at 429, 431, People v. Ramos, No. 3280-84 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. May 9–20, 1985) (on file with author). 
 62. GILLERS, supra note 57, at 4. 
 63. See People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977, 980 (App. Div. 1994). 
 64. People v. Ramos, 124 A.D.2d 1077 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), appeal denied, 69 
N.Y.2d 832 (1987). 
 65. See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma:  Consequences of 
Failing to Admit Guilt at a Parole Hearing, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 522 (2008) (“[P]ractically 
all New York state inmates [know] that a failure to ‘admit’ guilt at [a parole] hearing would 
probably ring the death knell to [their] chances for parole.”); see also Edwards v. Goord, 362 
F. App’x 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2010) (challenging unsuccessfully New York State Department 
of Correctional Services’ denial of “good time” credit based on inmate’s refusal to admit 
guilt resulting in inmate having to serve his complete sentence). 
 66. See Amended Complaint at 12, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21770-93 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. filed Oct. 20, 1995) (on file with author). 
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insurance carrier, fearing a massive judgment, settled, but a defense 
investigator, believing Ramos to be innocent, obtained permission to share 
his investigative discoveries with Ramos and his mother.67  They, in turn, 
hired the author’s law firm.  Based largely upon the investigator’s records, 
Ramos moved for a new trial, and an evidentiary hearing was held.68
The court found in its decision that the trial prosecutor had assured 
defense counsel that she would obtain and disclose all relevant social 
service and day care center records, but had then failed to do so.
 
69  Before 
or during trial, Assistant District Attorney Diana Farrell did obtain 
numerous documents and interviewed teachers and administrators, but she 
did not disclose the following information that was in her actual or 
constructive possession70
(1) The child initially denied repeatedly that anything had happened 
other than he “taped my mouth,” before finally accusing Ramos;
: 
71
(2) Prior to the alleged rape, the child had described watching sexually 
explicit programs on television, would use dolls to simulate sex during 
show and tell in school, was described by her teachers as “sexually wiser” 
than the other children and street smart, and would expose herself;
 
72
(3) The child used to masturbate on a regular basis in school,
 
73
(4) As revealed by a sign-in, sign-out book, the child’s grandmother had 
not picked her up at all on the day in question; in fact, she had been picked 
up by her aunt.
 thereby 
explaining her vaginal irritation; and 
74
In vacating Ramos’s conviction, the court issued a scathing opinion 
crediting the defendant’s witnesses over the sometimes contrary testimony 
of the trial prosecutor.  While declining to find that the prosecutor’s 
misconduct had been willful, the court termed it “cavalier and haphazard,” 
and continued:  “The greatest crime in a civilized society is an unjust 
conviction.  It is truly a scandal which reflects unfavorably on all 
participants in the criminal justice system.”
 
75
The Bronx District Attorney appealed.  In addition to attacking the 
evidentiary basis for the lower court’s factual findings, the Office’s brief, 
submitted in the name of the Bronx District Attorney Robert T. Johnson, 
contended that none of the undisclosed information consisted of Brady 
  The court released Ramos on 
his own recognizance, pending retrial. 
 
 67. See Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 980. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. at 982. 
 70. Decision and Order at 3, People v. Ramos, No. 3280-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 
dated June 1, 1992) (on file with author).  
 71. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 981. 
 72. See id. at 980–81. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See People v. Ramos, No. 3280-84, slip op. at 9, 1992 WL 12620540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Bronx Co. June 1, 1992), aff’d, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977. 
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material.76  “By placing the dolls in close proximity she could have been 
simulating wrestling or some other activity,” the District Attorney argued.77  
What is more, the dolls were not “anatomically correct.”78  The District 
Attorney speculated that the child had not really seen sexual acts on 
television because “[i]t is common knowledge that such movies do not 
contain hard-core pornographic footage”79  The new information about 
masturbation was not material because the defense already had a document 
suggesting the child masturbated (although on the witness stand her teacher 
denied such knowledge).  Finally, the District Attorney argued that the sign-
in, sign-out log need not have been disclosed because it did not “touch upon 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.”80  The Appellate Division affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling in an even more scathing opinion.81  The District 
Attorney’s Office then agreed that it lacked any “reasonable cause” to 
continue the prosecution, and dismissed all charges.82
b.  The Attorney Grievance Process 
 
Shortly after the trial court issued its decision vacating Ramos’s 
conviction, Ramos’s prosecutor received notice from the Departmental 
Disciplinary Committee of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, First Judicial Department, of a secret sua sponte disciplinary 
inquiry.83  The Departmental Disciplinary Committee is the New York 
State authority charged with the investigation and discipline of attorneys 
accused of professional misconduct.84  It may initiate an investigation of an 
attorney upon a complaint or “on its own initiative.”85  Upon such 
investigation, it has the authority to impose sanctions on an attorney 
ranging from the most serious punishment of disbarment to a private letter 
of “admonition.”86  Under the New York State Judiciary Law, the conduct 
of such an investigation—including its very existence—is confidential 
unless the Disciplinary Committee finds that the attorney should be publicly 
reprimanded.87
After learning of the Disciplinary Committee’s investigation, Ramos’s 
prosecutor sat down with Counsel to the District Attorney Anthony Girese, 
 
 
 76. Appellant’s Brief at 29, People v. Ramos, No. 3280-84 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 7, 
1993) (on file with author). 
 77. See id. at 30. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 31. 
 80. Id. at 32. 
 81. People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977 (App. Div. 1994). 
 82. Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 678, 685 (App. Div. 2001). 
 83. Id. at 668–69, 750–51. 
 84. See Departmental Disciplinary Committee, N.Y. STATE SUPREME COURT APPELLATE 
DIV. FIRST DEP’T., http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad1/Committees&Programs/DDC/
index.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 85. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.6(a) (1994). 
 86. Id. § 605.5(a). 
 87. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(10) (McKinney 2002). 
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and together they prepared a letter defending her conduct.88  The letter 
stated that there was “no misconduct” on her part, and asked that any 
inquiry be deferred until the appeal was decided.89  The prosecutor also 
wrote her own letters to the Disciplinary Committee defending her 
conduct.90  She also gave confidential sworn testimony, which she refused 
during the lawsuit to consent to unseal.91  The Committee dismissed the 
disciplinary action.92
c.  The Civil Lawsuit 
  At no time did the Committee afford Ramos or his 
counsel notice of the prosecutor’s contentions or any opportunity to provide 
any materials or arguments concerning whether she had committed ethics 
violations. 
While the Ramos post-judgment hearing was underway, the Second 
Circuit decided Walker v. City of New York.93  Walker contained two 
principal legal holdings of relevance to Ramos.  First, a District Attorney’s 
failure to adequately train or supervise his staff to comply with their 
obligations to disclose Brady material, and not to present false or perjured 
testimony, could give rise to Monell liability under  
§ 1983.94  The plaintiff would have to show that the District Attorney had 
been deliberately indifferent to an obvious need for greater training, 
supervision, or discipline, and that this policy of indifference was a 
substantial cause of the violation of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional 
rights.95  Second, although a New York municipality is not subject to suit 
under § 1983 for a District Attorney’s “prosecutorial” decisions that he 
makes on behalf of the State, it may be sued for a District Attorney’s 
“managerial” or “administrative” functions that he performs as a 
policymaker on behalf of the City of New York, including constitutionally 
faulty training or supervision of his staff.96
Based upon Walker, and armed with the Appellate Division’s ringing 
denunciation of the District Attorney’s conduct at Ramos’ criminal trial, 
 
 
 88. See Deposition of Diana Farrell at 683, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21170-93 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. deposed Oct. 7, 1997) (on file with author). 
 89. See id. at 689. 
 90. See Letter from Diana Farrell to Andral Bratton, Departmental Disciplinary Comm., 
Supreme Court of the State of N.Y., Appellate Div., First Dep’t (Mar. 15, 1995) (on file with 
author); Letter from Diana Farrell to Andral Bratton, Departmental Disciplinary Comm., 
Supreme Court of the State of N.Y., Appellate Div., First Dep’t (Nov. 29, 1994) (on file with 
author). 
 91. See Deposition of Diana Farrell, supra note 88, at 687. 
 92. See id. 
 93. 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 94. See id. at 296, 300. 
 95. Although Walker suggested that a showing of inadequate training could be made 
without a history of prior complaints or findings of similar misconduct, that view was 
overruled by the Supreme Court in Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).  However, 
the Ramos lawsuit, and the others brought by the author, have been based on multiple prior 
incidents of misconduct, a history of failure to discipline, and evidence of ratification 
reflecting an unlawful policy. 
 96. Walker, 974 F.2d at 301. 
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Ramos elected to bring a § 1983 lawsuit in the State Supreme Court in 
Bronx County.  Ramos claimed that the trial prosecutor’s misconduct had 
resulted from the District Attorney’s deliberate indifference to his staff’s 
history of obtaining unlawful convictions by violating Brady and relying on 
false or misleading evidence and argument, exhibited by his failure to 
properly train, supervise, and discipline prosecutors to avoid or to deter 
such violations, and by his ratification of such misconduct when it 
occurred.97
To substantiate this claim, Ramos sought disclosure of the personnel and 
disciplinary records of the prosecutors who had been involved in seventy-
two reported cases in which courts had found violations of Brady 
obligations (eighteen cases), or other violations of the duty not to present 
false, misleading, or inflammatory evidence or summation argument (fifty-
four cases).  The majority of the decisions had been handed down between 
the mid-1970s and District Attorney Merola’s death in 1987, but a 
significant number had occurred from 1989 through 1996, during the 
Administration of District Attorney Johnson.  The City resisted such 
document disclosure, and moved for dismissal or summary judgment 
regarding Ramos’ § 1983 claim.  While the lower court denied this motion, 
it limited disclosure of records to those relating to just ten of the seventy-
two court decisions.
 
98  Both sides appealed.  Ramos fully prevailed.99
In its decision, the Appellate Division, noting the “catastrophic” result 
when prosecutors wrongfully convict a defendant by withholding materially 
favorable information,
 
100 upheld Ramos’ civil rights claim, while granting 
all of the document discovery Ramos sought.  Agreeing with the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in Walker, the court held that under state law, a District 
Attorney is a local policymaker with respect to training and supervising 
staff concerning its Brady obligations.101  The court further held that under 
the facts in Ramos’s case, the City could be liable for both the District 
Attorney’s consistent failure to discipline prosecutors who caused 
unconstitutional convictions—by withholding Brady material or by 
knowingly relying on false or misleading evidence or argument—and for 
the District Attorney’s ratification of such misconduct in Ramos’s own 
case, through his “strident opposition” to Ramos’s motion and failure to 
discipline Ramos’s trial prosecutor.102
 
 97. See Amended Complaint, supra note 
  The court directed the City to name 
the prosecutors involved in all seventy-two misconduct cases and to provide 
66, at 24–36.  The complaint also named as 
defendants the Human Resources Administration (HRA) and the New York City Police 
Department, under different theories of liability. Id. 
 98. Decision and Order, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21770-93, 1999 WL 
34804917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. dated Oct. 27, 1999) (on file with author).  
 99. Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 2001). 
 100. See id. at 681. 
 101. See id. at 693. 
 102. See id. at 694–95. 
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their personnel records, including their salary cards and evaluations, and 
any evidence of discipline.103
The records, finally disclosed a year later without any confidentiality 
order, revealed that from 1975 through 1996, during the administration of 
three District Attorneys, there was just one incidence of any prosecutor 
being disciplined.  This prosecutor was one of fourteen prosecutors who 
had been involved in more than one of the trials in which misconduct had 
been found.
 
104  A second prosecutor had conducted five of the trials, while 
a third had conducted four,105 yet neither of these latter two prosecutors, 
according to the records, had ever been disciplined.106  Indeed, the District 
Attorney’s Office conceded that payroll and other records “do not indicate 
the existence of any disciplinary measures taken against any of th[e]  
ADAs.”107
The prosecutor who received “discipline” did so in connection with a 
robbery conviction he obtained after trial in February 1977.
  A more detailed review of the three prosecutors just mentioned 
is revealing. 
108  The 
criminal defendant promptly appealed that conviction and alleged an 
extraordinary number of prosecutorial improprieties.109  In a decision dated 
April 13, 1978, the Appellate Division resoundingly agreed.  It denounced 
the prosecutor for “overzealous,” “improper conduct . . . throughout the 
trial, despite repeated admonitions by the court,”110 including disparaging 
the “so-called presumption of innocence” and “reasonable doubt” and 
continually “disregard[ing] and overriding . . . the court’s rulings and 
instructions.”111  In reversing the conviction, the court cited the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and implied that the prosecutor had violated 
it.112  The prosecutor’s salary record showed that when the trial occurred, 
he was earning $21,500.113  Notwithstanding the Office’s notice of his 
misconduct presented by the defendant’s appeal, he received salary 
increases over the next year of $4,500—or 21 percent.114
 
 103. See id.  The court’s directive was contained in its initial, published decision and in 
an unpublished supplemental order on file with the author. Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental 
Demand for Discovery & Inspection, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21770-93 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Bronx Co. Mar. 17, 1998) (on file with author); see also Order, Ramos v. City of New 
York, No. 21770-93 (N.Y. App. Div. dated Dec. 27, 2001) (on file with author). 
  After the court 
handed down its decision, the prosecutor suffered a deduction of four weeks 
 104. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21770-93 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. filed Apr. 1, 1996) (on file with author). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Letter from Stuart P. Levy, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Office of the Dist. Attorney, 
Bronx Cnty., to Hon. Betty Owen Stinson, Supreme Court of the State of N.Y., Bronx Cnty. 
(July 24, 2002) (on file with author). 
 108. See People v. Bussey, 403 N.Y.S.2d 739, 739 (App. Div. 1978). 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 741–42. 
 112. Id. at 742. 
 113. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 104. 
 114. Id. 
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of pay, or approximately $2,150.115  However, he then received a bonus of 
$250 on June 30, 1978, and a $2,500 salary increase on July 1, 1978, more 
than making up for his lost income.116
Between 1978 and 1981, the same prosecutor was derided by three more 
appellate opinions in two cases (although neither conviction was 
reversed),
 
117 but continued to receive raises in compensation.  Dissenting 
judges in two of the decisions suggested that such “egregious” conduct be 
referred for professional discipline,118 noting that the same trial assistant 
had been denounced in prior decisions for “outrageous and abusive 
conduct”119 and “improper and tasteless” behavior.120  On November 24, 
1981, Associate Judge Bernard Meyer of the New York Court of Appeals 
reminded the District Attorney of his “continuing obligation with respect to 
his trial assistants . . . to instruct them clearly and firmly against using such 
tactics.”121  Yet, during the four-year period beginning July 1, 1978, the 
prosecutor received “merit” and other raises totaling $13,500, until he was 
earning $42,000 by July 1, 1982.122
On November 22, 1982, District Attorney Merola wrote to a member of 
the Appellate Division’s Departmental Disciplinary Committee, asking it to 
reconsider its initial finding in connection with a disciplinary inquiry 
concerning the conduct of the prosecutor.
 
123  Merola assured the Committee 
that he already had authorized disciplinary measures which took into 
account all of the prosecutor’s misconduct and that, in light of his 
subsequent performance, these early trials in his career were an 
“aberration.”124
Significantly, in the prosecutor’s next evaluation after the court decisions 
in 1980 and 1981 that so vehemently condemned his performances, his 
bureau chief scored his overall quality of performance as a “4” out of a 
possible “5.”
  It appears the Committee did reconsider, as there is no 
evidence that the prosecutor was sanctioned. 
125  While the supervisor noted the Assistant District 
Attorney’s “involvement with the App[ellate] Div[ision] Disciplinary 
Committee,” he did so not as a reflection of the quality of the prosecutor’s 
trial performance, but rather as an explanation for his drop off in 
“productivity.”126
 
 115. Id. 
  Indeed, praised for being “cooperative and 
 116. Id. 
 117. People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396 (1981), aff’g 430 N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 1980); 
People v. Wheeler, 438 N.Y.S.2d 467 (App. Div. 1981). 
 118. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d at 414 n.4 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 415 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Bussey, 403 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 
(App. Div. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 467) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d at 415. 
 122. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 104. 
 123. Letter from Mario Merola, Dist. Attorney, Office of the Dist. Attorney, Bronx Cnty., 
to Martin London, Supreme Court, Appellate Div., Departmental Disciplinary Comm. (Nov. 
22, 1982) (on file with author). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 104. 
 126. Id. 
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conscientious,” the only additional criticism the prosecutor received was for 
“lateness . . . which he has been counseled about repeatedly.”127  The 
following year, the same supervisor had nothing but superlatives for this 
Assistant District Attorney.128  Recommending him for promotion to 
“senior trial status,” the Bureau Chief gushed:  “Tremendous ability to 
plead def[endan]ts with the weakest proof.”129  He continued as a Bronx 
Assistant District Attorney until his retirement in 1997.130
The prosecutor responsible for five of the misconduct decisions was 
found in an appellate decision in October 1982 to have engaged in 
“persistent misconduct [during summation, which] deprived the defendant 
of his right to a fair trial,” resulting in the reversal of a manslaughter 
conviction.
 
131  Three years later, the same court reversed another 
manslaughter conviction obtained by the same prosecutor six months after 
the prior decision.132  The court was irate that the prosecutor had “blatantly 
violated defendant’s rights”133 even after being chastised in the prior 
opinion, and termed the prosecutor’s conduct “willful and deliberate.”134
[W]hen the misconduct is so pervasive, so egregious and results in 
violations of fundamental due process rights, and the prosecutor’s 
disregard of the court’s rulings and warnings is as deliberate and 
reprehensible as that of this prosecutor, who has twice before provoked 
reversals by this court, a reversal is the only responsible remedy we can 
invoke as guardians of the rights of the People.
  
The following year, reversing a third manslaughter conviction obtained by 
the same prosecutor, the same court commented: 
135
The prosecutor left the Office’s employ in 1984, after six years.  There 
was nothing in his personnel file to indicate that he did not leave voluntarily 
or was disciplined in any way.  Meanwhile, on July 1, 1983—after the trial 
in which he had “blatantly violated” the defendant’s rights in conduct that 
the court found to have been “willful and deliberate”—he received a salary 
adjustment and “merit” bonus totaling $4,500, which amounted to more 
than 10 percent of his previous salary.
 
136
As for the prosecutor cited in four decisions, three involved summation 
and other trial-related misconduct—resulting in two reversals and one 
finding of harmless error—and one involved an apparent Brady violation 
which was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
 
137
 
 127. Id. 
  Within five weeks of 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See People v. Perez, 455 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (App. Div. 1982). 
 132. See People v. Rosa, 489 N.Y.S.2d 722, 728 (App. Div. 1985). 
 133. Id. at 726. 
 134. Id. at 728. 
 135. People v. Sandy, 499 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (App. Div. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 136. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 104. 
 137. See People v. Qualls, 70 N.Y.2d 863 (1987) (remanding for evidentiary hearing 
concerning apparent Brady violation); People v. Jorge, 566 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650 (App. Div. 
1991) (reversing murder conviction because prosecutor misstated the testimony and cited the 
Bible while exhorting the jury to “do your duty”); People v. Taylor, 556 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. 
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the first reversal, he received “merit” increases and bonuses totaling 
$11,500, or more than 15 percent of his previous salary.138  Following the 
other court decisions, including the reversal in 1991, he received yearly 
“merit” increases ranging from $1,000 to $4,000.139
Ramos’s trial prosecutor also received no sanction for her misbehavior.  
During her deposition, she testified that “everything [she] did in connection 
with the Ramos prosecution was consistent with [her] training.”
  His evaluations were 
not provided. 
140  She 
testified that she believed she was required to disclose only evidence that 
was “blatantly Brady” because it “tended to exonerate the defendant” or 
was “crucial” or, as to impeachment evidence, only if she determined after 
investigation that it was “truthful.”141  She revealed that shortly after the 
hearing court’s decision was handed down, she met with District Attorney 
Johnson, Chief Assistant Barry Kluger, and Counsel Girese, and received 
their complete support, including their agreement to appeal the decision.142  
Before the appeal was denied, and believing that the negative publicity 
about the case had stalled her career, she voluntarily left the Office and 
solicited and obtained an appointment to the “18-B” panel, a court-certified 
panel of private attorneys assigned to represent indigent criminal 
defendants.143
Numerous other court decisions about which discovery was provided 
involved findings of deliberate, intentional, or flagrant misbehavior.  In one 
case, the appellate court upheld the defendant’s claim that “he was deprived 
of due process by the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony,” and 
faulted the prosecutor’s failure to comport with the district attorney’s 
“responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the 
truth.”
 
144  Another prosecutor, in People v. Lantigua,145 was found to have 
knowingly withheld crucial Brady material which proved the falsity of her 
summation to the jury.  The appellate court wrote:  “It hardly advances the 
interest of justice for a prosecutor to use testimony she knows to be false to 
discredit the evidence given by defense witnesses during her 
summation.”146  The appellate court found yet another prosecutor’s 
“decision to accuse the defendant (and squarely implicat[e] his counsel) of 
fabricating his defense” during summation to be “indefensible.”147
 
Div. 1990) (declining to reverse for prosecutor’s Biblical quotations); People v. Hamilton, 
502 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (App. Div. 1986) (reversing robbery conviction “because the 
fundamental fairness of the trial was severely impaired by repetitive improper prosecutorial 
trial tactics”). 
  Other 
 138. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 104. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Deposition of Diana Farrell, supra note 88, at 844. 
 141. Id. at 303, 318–19, 762, 767, 769. 
 142. Id. at 667. 
 143. Id. 
 144. People v. Olmo, 545 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286–87 (App. Div. 1989) (quoting People v. 
Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557 (1956)). 
 145. 643 N.Y.S.2d 963 (App. Div. 1996). 
 146. Id. at 969. 
 147. People v. Negron, 556 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (App. Div. 1990). 
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appellate decisions found flagrant or intentional summation misconduct as 
well as Brady violations requiring reversal.148
Two more depositions of note were conducted.  Mitchell Borger, the 
Assistant District Attorney who handled the beginning stages of the Ramos 
prosecution, including the submission of testimony to the grand jury, 
testified that he was unaware of any disciplinary policy or procedure while 
he was at the Office or that any prosecutor had ever been disciplined.
  All of the prosecutors in 
these cases continued to receive increases in compensation; none, according 
to the records provided, were disciplined. 
149  
The Executive Assistant District Attorney under District Attorney Johnson, 
Eric Warner, who had been Farrell’s bureau chief at the time of the Ramos 
trial and was involved in training at the time of his deposition in 2000,  
testified to his understanding that Brady only applied where the defendant 
had made a specific request for the material.150  He did not recall that there 
was any Brady training at all under District Attorney Merola or that he had 
received such training himself; he could not find any evidence of Brady 
training materials before 1995 (six years into Johnson’s tenure);151 and he 
was unaware of any Assistant District Attorney at the Office having ever 
been disciplined for violating Brady.152
Ramos’s case was concluded before any of this evidence could be 
presented to a jury.  In 2003, Ramos accepted a settlement of $5 million.
 
153
 
 148. See People v. Banfield, 599 N.Y.S.2d 227 (App. Div. 1993) (reversing conviction 
where prosecutor promised witness “favorable disposition” of witness’s case, but did not 
disclose that to defendants); People v. Byfield, 194 A.D.2d 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) 
(companion case to Banfield); People v. Mudd, 585 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (App. Div. 1992) 
(finding summation statements “entirely outside the bounds of rhetorical comment”); People 
v. McReynolds, 572 N.Y.S.2d 8, 8 (App. Div. 1991) (finding that prosecutor “so 
overstepped the bounds of permissible comment that [the defendant] was denied a fair 
trial”); People v. Bagarozy, 522 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854–55 (App. Div. 1987) (deciding that 
inflammatory summation and evidence distracted jury from real issues in the case); People v. 
Bailey, 503 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that inflammatory summation and 
vouching was “calculated to produce a wrongful conviction”); People v. Hamilton, 502 
N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (App. Div. 1986) (noting that “central theme” of summation was “wholly 
improper”); People v. Ortiz, 497 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (App. Div. 1986) (reversing conviction 
based on prosecutor’s “obdurate pattern of inflammatory remarks throughout the . . . 
summation”); People v. Pressley, 462 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866–67 (App. Div. 1983) (reversing 
conviction for prosecutor’s “repeated[ ] attack[s]” on defendant and improper “persistent 
references” to defendant’s refusal to incriminate himself by cooperating with law 
enforcement); see also Rosario Violation May Be Raised on CPA §440.10 Motion, N.Y. L.J., 
Sept. 8, 1989, at 21 (summarizing decision in People v. Okafor, noting that court found 
Rosario and Brady violations and reversed conviction where prosecutor withheld potentially 
exculpatory witness statements in a child sex abuse case). 
  
 149. Deposition of Mitchell Borger at 184–92, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21170-
93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. deposed Mar. 11, 1998) (on file with author). 
 150. Deposition of Eric Warner at 52, Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21170-93 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. deposed June 15, 2000) (on file with author). But see United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976) (Brady material must be turned over to defense even 
without specific request). 
 151. Deposition of Eric Warner, supra note 150, at 18–20. 
 152. Id. at 82–83. 
 153. Andrea Elliott, City Gives $5 Million to Man Wrongly Imprisoned in Child’s Rape, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at B3. 
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At the time, this was the largest settlement of any wrongful conviction case 
in New York State.154  Defending the conduct of the District Attorney’s 
Office to the New York Times, District Attorney Johnson and Chief 
Assistant Kluger contended that prosecutors were dealt with “on an 
individual basis,” apparently informally, that often a prosecutor cited for 
misconduct was no longer employed by the Office when the appellate 
decision criticizing his conduct was handed down, and that “[n]ot one of 
[the seventy-two cases] involves a finding of deliberate or intentional . . . 
concealment of evidence. . . .  They were technical rulings or a slip of the 
tongue.”155
 2.  The Maldonado and Poventud Cases 
 
Despite the Ramos settlement and increased public attention to the 
problem of wrongful convictions, attitudes at the top of the Bronx District 
Attorney’s Office do not appear to have changed.  This is revealed by 
depositions and document discovery in two additional companion lawsuits 
in which the author is co-counsel.  The lawsuits arise from a joint criminal 
prosecution in 1997–98 of two defendants, Robert Maldonado and Marcos 
Poventud, for the attempted murder and attempted robbery of a livery cab 
driver.  The cab driver, who was shot in the head and barely survived, was 
the only witness identifying either defendant at trial and linking them to the 
crime.  With the defense challenging the cab driver’s ability to make 
accurate identifications, the police suppressed the fact that this eyewitness 
initially had identified as one of the perpetrators a man who was in prison 
when the crime occurred (the Brady material).  After this information later 
surfaced, Maldonado, who had spent four years in prison, was acquitted at a 
retrial, while Poventud succeeded in overturning his conviction after nine 
years in prison on collateral attack.  Maldonado’s civil lawsuit is pending in 
the State Supreme Court in the Bronx; Poventud’s is pending in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.156
In their separate lawsuits, both Maldonado and Poventud alleged that the 
police suppressed the Brady material from prosecutors as well as the 
defense, or alternatively that prosecutors learned about the Brady material 
but colluded with the police in suppressing it from the defense.  The latter 
theory was part of the plaintiffs’ Monell claim, similar to the claim in the 
Ramos case, contending that the Bronx District Attorney’s deliberate 
indifference to a history of Brady and related due process violations 
committed by his subordinates had been a substantial cause of the 
 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the Price, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at 25. 
 156. See Poventud v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 3998 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 22, 2007); 
Maldonado v. City of New York, No. 17568-2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. filed June 14, 
2004). 
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misconduct that caused the plaintiffs’ wrongful convictions.157
During pretrial discovery, the plaintiffs, as in the Ramos case, obtained 
disclosure of prosecutors’ personnel and “disciplinary” records in 
connection with cases where courts had found misconduct.
  Discovery 
in the two cases was consolidated. 
158  Plaintiffs’ 
demand was limited to cases that were decided under District Attorney 
Johnson, from 1989 through 2006.159  Not a single document was produced 
evidencing any disciplinary action against any of the prosecutors.160
Depositions were taken of the Office’s executive staff, including Odalys 
Alonso, the Chief Assistant District Attorney, who has responsibility for the 
overall management of the Office, including hiring, firing, and discipline; 
the Counsel to the District Attorney since 1989, Anthony Girese, who deals 
with legal issues and has been the Office’s liaison with the Departmental 
Disciplinary Committee; the Chief of Appeals since 1994, Joseph Ferdenzi; 
and District Attorney Johnson. 
 
Testifying as a representative witness under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 30(b)(6) on the issue of discipline at the Office,161 Alonso 
acknowledged that neither the Office’s standard employment agreement, 
nor its employee manual, nor any other document, contains any provisions 
concerning internal disciplining of prosecutors for misconduct in 
connection with the handling of criminal cases.162  The Office has no 
written policy or procedure setting forth specific rules of behavior, defining 
infractions of such rules—including whether punishment may be inflicted 
for negligence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference to defendants’ 
constitutional rights as opposed to willful, deliberate violations—or 
providing notice of the types of discipline that may be imposed for 
infractions.163  The “system” for discipline is that the District Attorney is 
told when court decisions or defense motions or appeals alleging improper 
behavior are received by the Office, and then he determines whether to 
conduct an investigation or to impose some form of discipline.164
 
 157. See Amended Complaint, Poventud v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 3998 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Oct. 28, 2010) (on file with author); Amended Complaint, Maldonado v. City of New 
York, No. 17568-2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. filed Nov. 8, 2006) (on file with author). 
  There is 
 158. See Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories & Request for Document Production, 
Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 CV 3998 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 12, 2007) (on file with 
author); Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Document Production, 
Maldonado v. City of New York, No. 17568-2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. filed June 14, 
2004) (on file with author). 
 159. See Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories & Request for Document Production, 
Poventud v. City of New York, supra note 158; Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories & 
Request for Document Production, Maldonado v. City of New York, supra note 158. 
 160. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 CV 
3998 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 22, 2007); Letter from Gerard J. Marino, Assistant Corp. Counsel, 
City of New York Law Dep’t, to Anthony Cecutti, Romano & Kuan, LLC (Nov. 26, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
 161. Deposition of Odalys Alonso at 2, Poventud v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 3998 
(S.D.N.Y. deposed Nov. 29, 2010) (on file with author). 
 162. Id. at 39–42. 
 163. Id. at 66–70. 
 164. Id. at 44–45. 
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no standard for determining when discipline will be imposed, other than the 
subjective judgment of the District Attorney. 
Alonso, who has been a supervisor or a member of the executive staff 
during Johnson’s entire twenty-two-year tenure in office, recalled only a 
single instance of formal discipline, occurring in January 2002.165  Girese, 
in his deposition, could recall no instance.166  Neither could District 
Attorney Johnson.167  In the incident recalled by Alonso, Johnson himself 
happened to walk into a courtroom where one of his Assistant District 
Attorneys was delivering a summation and was offended that it contained 
gratuitously inflammatory content.168  Alonso testified that Johnson 
immediately instructed that Assistant District Attorney’s supervisor to 
discipline the Assistant District Attorney, which she purportedly did 
through an oral admonishment and by withholding any raise or bonus at the 
prosecutor’s next salary review.169  However, no records were produced 
evidencing that such sanctions were imposed.170  On appeal, the Office 
fully defended the Assistant District Attorney’s conduct as appropriate171
Alonso did testify, however, that she was told by her predecessor, Chief 
Assistant District Attorney Kluger, that under Johnson’s policy, whenever 
the Appellate Division reversed convictions for summation misconduct, he 
would orally chastise the Assistant District Attorney if he or she was still in 
the Office.
 
despite the supposed finding by the District Attorney himself that the 
prosecutor had behaved so inappropriately that he deserved to be 
sanctioned.  This was the single prosecutor during Johnson’s twenty-two 
years in office that anyone could recall was formally “disciplined” for 
violating a rule of behavior in the prosecution of a criminal case. 
172  In most of these cases, the Office was at the same time 
arguing on appeal that there had been no misconduct.  Johnson was 
unaware of any record of Assistant District Attorneys who have been orally 
chastised, and could not recall any specific instance where it occurred.173  
Johnson said that prior misconduct would be a factor in a subsequent 
disciplinary decision, but acknowledged that no records are kept of such 
misconduct or admonitions for it.174
 
 165. Id. at 59–60.  Odalys Alonso recalled that at some point in the past Assistant District 
Attorneys in the office were informed that another Assistant District Attorney was 
disciplined, but she did not recall any details about it, and the prosecutor did not receive any 
negative evaluation. Id. at 64. 
  Records are kept, however, of 
individual prosecutors’ successes in obtaining convictions at trial and by 
 166. Deposition of Anthony Girese at 119–20, Poventud v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 
3998 (S.D.N.Y. deposed Mar. 24, 2011) (on file with author). 
 167. Deposition of Robert Johnson at 60–66, Poventud v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 
3998 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 22, 2007) (on file with author).  
 168. Deposition of Odalys Alonso, supra note 161, at 124–25. 
 169. Id. at 131–33. 
 170. Id. at 140, 145–47 (stating that the prosecutor received a merit bonus and raise); see 
also Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 160 (on file with author). 
 171. Id. at 154–57. 
 172. See Deposition of Odalys Alonso, supra note 161, at 81–82, 289–90. 
 173. See Deposition of Robert Johnson, supra note 167, at 64–66. 
 174. See id. at 58–59, 65–67. 
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guilty plea.175  Johnson testified that he has never had to consider any 
discipline for Brady violations because there have been no “intentional” 
violations, to his knowledge, during his twenty-two-year tenure.176  In fact, 
during the Johnson era, there have been numerous court decisions finding 
flagrant or intentional Brady violations or misconduct during 
summations.177  Moreover, there have been “dozens” more decisions 
finding improper behavior but declining to reverse under the harmless error 
doctrine.178
Johnson acknowledged that his Office has no policy concerning referrals 
of prosecutors to the outside Departmental Disciplinary Committee for 
apparent ethical violations.
 
179  He also did not believe that the Office had 
ever made such a referral during his tenure.180  Counsel to the District 
Attorney Girese testified that it has been his role, since Johnson took office 
in 1989, to respond to inquiries from the Disciplinary Committee about 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct in his Office.  He was unaware, however, 
of any instance in which any prosecutor was sanctioned in relation to the 
handling of a criminal matter.181
 
 175. See id. at 71–72.  Johnson denied that he gives this factor any weight in promotions. 
Id. 
 
 176. See id. at 43. 
 177. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 848 N.Y.S.2d 137, 140 (App. Div. 2007) (finding 
prosecutor committed “flagrant violation” when he withheld material impeachment 
evidence, and criticizing the People’s defense of this conduct as “disingenuous” and 
“disquieting”); People v. Mickel, 710 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (App. Div. 2000) (reversing 
conviction where prosecutor failed to disclose “significant” Brady material); People v. 
Olivero, 710 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (App. Div. 2000) (finding prosecutor’s comments in 
summation “manifestly unfair”); People v. Lantigua, 643 N.Y.S.2d 963, 969 (App. Div. 
1996) (finding that prosecutor intentionally withheld Brady material and made knowingly 
false argument in summation); People v. Williams, 622 N.Y.S.2d 275, 275 (App. Div. 1995) 
(“The basis for the reversal of this case lies in the prosecutor’s repeated disregard of the 
rulings of the trial court . . . in asking improper questions of witnesses so that the 
constitutional right of the defendant to a fair trial was violated.”); People v. Banfield, 599 
N.Y.S.2d 227, 227 (App. Div. 1993) (reversing conviction where prosecutor promised 
witness “favorable disposition” of witness’s case, but did not disclose that to defendants); 
People v. Byfield, 194 A.D.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (companion case to 
Banfield); People v. Hernandez, 585 N.Y.S.2d 436, 436 (App. Div. 1992) (affirming 
conviction, but stating that it “deplore[d] [prosecutor’s] excesses [in summation] in the 
strongest possible terms and ask[ed] that prosecutors be trained and admonished to refrain 
from such unnecessary conduct”); People v. Butler, 585 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (App. Div. 1992) 
(prosecutor’s “overzealous[ ]” conduct and “numerous unwarranted remarks” during cross-
examination and summation “deprived defendant of a fair trial”); People v. Mudd, 585 
N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (App. Div. 1992) (finding summation comments “directly contradictory 
to the evidence, prejudicial and entirely outside the bounds of acceptable rhetorical 
comment”); People v. McReynolds, 572 N.Y.S.2d 8, 8 (App. Div. 1991) (noting that 
prosecutor “impugn[ed] the defense counsel’s integrity”); People v. Negron, 556 N.Y.S.2d 
41, 43 (App. Div. 1990) (finding summation comments “particularly offensive” and conduct 
“grossly improper”). 
 178. Deposition of Anthony Girese, supra note 166, at 129. 
 179. See Deposition of Robert Johnson, supra note 167, at 72–73. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Deposition of Anthony Girese, supra note 166, at 165–66. 
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B.  The Queens District Attorney’s Office:  The Su Case 
1. Criminal Proceedings 
Shih Wei Su was eighteen years old when he was convicted of attempted 
murder at trial in Queens in 1992.  The underlying incident involved the 
shooting of two victims at a pool hall in what the prosecution contended 
was a youth gang-related incident.182  The principal prosecution witness 
was Jeffrey Tom, a member of the Green Dragons,183 which was a rival of 
the gang with which Su was allegedly affiliated, the White Tigers.184  
Neither Tom nor the two victims who were with him at the time of the 
shooting implicated Su in their initial statements to police,185 but they all 
changed their story at about the same time and implicated him in one way 
or another.186  Tom was the most damaging witness, claiming that he knew 
Su and heard him give an order to shoot.187  Although Tom had his own 
robbery-by-extortion case, he denied, under questioning by the prosecutor, 
that the lenient plea bargain he had received (a youthful offender 
adjudication and sentence of probation) had resulted from any deal with the 
District Attorney’s Office.188  The prosecution in her summation argued 
that Tom’s testimony was truthful.189  Su was convicted and received the 
maximum sentence of sixteen and two-thirds to fifty years in prison.190
Su repeatedly challenged his conviction, both on direct appeal and 
collateral attack,
 
191 claiming that Tom must have received some sort of 
promise or benefit in exchange for his testimony.192  However, the District 
Attorney argued successfully that either Su or his attorneys were remiss for 
not making Tom’s sealed plea and sentencing minutes part of the record.193  
In 1999, over the District Attorney’s objection, a judge finally ordered 
Tom’s plea and sentencing minutes unsealed, reasoning that the District 
Attorney “has no legitimate interest in shielding possible perjury.”194  The 
minutes proved that a prosecutor had made an explicit, on-the-record deal 
with Tom to grant him leniency in exchange for his trial testimony against 
Su.195
 
 182. Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2003). 
  Tom’s flat denials, elicited by a different prosecutor at Su’s trial, 
 183. See id. at 121–22. 
 184. See id. at 122. 
 185. See Complaint at 4, Su v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 687 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 
16, 2006) (on file with author). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Su, 335 F.3d at 122. 
 188. Id. at 123–24. 
 189. Id. at 124–25. 
 190. Complaint, supra note 185, at 8. 
 191. People v. Su, 624 N.Y.S.2d 904 (App. Div. 1995), leave to appeal denied, 85 
N.Y.2d 980 (1995); People v. Su, 699 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div. 1999), leave to appeal 
denied, 94 N.Y.2d 925 (2000); People v. Su, 721 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 2001). 
 192. Complaint, supra note 185, at 8 (reciting grounds for Su’s post-trial motions). 
 193. Id. at 8–9 (describing People’s opposition). 
 194. Motion:  Unsealing at 2, People v. Su, No. 658-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co. dated 
Jan. 21, 1999) (on file with author). 
 195. Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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had been false.196  But the New York courts still would not grant Su any 
relief, accepting the District Attorney’s additional procedural argument that 
Su’s Brady violation claim should not be considered on the merits.197
Finally, on July 11, 2003, the Second Circuit granted Su’s federal habeas 
corpus petition and directed that he be retried within sixty days or 
released.
 
198  The court excoriated the prosecutor for “knowingly elicit[ing] 
false testimony”199 from a witness whose credibility was “central to the 
deliberations of any reasonable jury,”200 for failing to correct such false 
testimony, and for “bolster[ing]” Tom’s lies during her closing 
argument.201  In vacating the conviction, it reasoned that a conviction 
obtained through “testimony the prosecutor knows to be false is repugnant 
to the Constitution.”202  As the Bronx District Attorney’s Office had done 
in the Poventud case, the Queens District Attorney tried to get Su to accept 
a “time-served” plea bargain, but Su refused.  After postponing the trial on 
several occasions, District Attorney Richard Brown’s Office, on November 
5, 2003, moved to dismiss all charges.203
 2.  The Attorney Grievance Process 
 
 On September 12, 2003, even while he was facing the prospect of 
retrial, Su filed a formal pro se complaint against the prosecutor with the 
Grievance Committee of the New York State Appellate Division, Second 
Judicial Department.204  He asked for an investigation and sanction of the 
prosecutor for knowingly eliciting and failing to correct false testimony, 
and attached a copy of the Second Circuit’s decision.205  Su later submitted 
a supplemental letter, informing the Committee that his case had been 
dismissed for insufficient evidence, and that the prosecutor had been 
responsible for his wrongful imprisonment from ages seventeen through 
thirty.206
 
 196. See id. at 121. 
  He said he could not afford an attorney and that “while [the 
prosecutor] certainly will have her powerful attorneys and friends on her 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at 130. 
 199. Id. at 128. 
 200. Id. at 129. 
 201. Id. at 127. 
 202. Id. at 126. 
 203. See Proceedings at 2, People v. Su, No. 0658-91 (N.Y. Sup Ct. Queens Co. dated 
Nov. 5, 2003) (on file with author).  
 204. Letter from Shih Wei Su to Second Dep’t Grievance Comm. (Sept. 12, 2003) (on file 
with author). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Letter from Shih Wei Su to Melissa D. Broder, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. State 
Grievance Comm. for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists. (Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with 
author); see also Jim Dwyer, Prosecutor Misconduct, at a Cost of $3.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2008, at A27 (reporting on Su’s correspondence with the Grievance Committee). 
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side, I firmly believe . . . this committee will not allow [the prosecutor] to 
manipulate the justice [sic] again.”207
On December 12, 2003, the prosecutor submitted a remarkable letter 
prepared by her attorney, but which she endorsed with her signature.
  Su was wrong. 
208  It 
pleaded with the Committee for sympathy, pointing out that she was 
married and had two young children.  The Su case “was considered old and 
probably in a position to be dismissed for failure to prosecute . . . [and] was 
thought to be a loser and was dumped in her lap,” the letter contended.209  
“[P]erhaps without being adept as a result of her inexperience,” the letter 
asserted, the prosecutor had inadvertently elicited false answers from her 
witness and had not known how to correct them.210  While acknowledging 
that the prosecutor’s conduct had been “naive, inexperienced and, possibly, 
stupid,” the letter shifted blame to the District Attorney’s Office for not 
ensuring that she knew about the deal made by another prosecutor with her 
witness, contending, “[P]rosecutorial misconduct need not be the doing of 
the last assigned assistant, though he/she unwittingly kept it in motion and 
caused it to occur.”211
Su refuted the prosecutor’s arguments by letter dated January 22, 
2004.
 
212  He contended that she had not just been a passive, hapless victim 
of a rogue witness, but had refused to correct Tom’s testimony when Su’s 
trial counsel had complained that it could not be true, and that she then 
“capitalized” on the false testimony in her summation by “vouch[ing] for 
Tom’s truthfulness, honesty, and lack of evasiveness.”213  Su pointed out 
that the Second Circuit’s decision had found her misconduct to have been 
deliberate.  Further, Su contended, the prosecutor could not blame her 
knowing elicitation of and failure to correct false testimony on inexperience 
when basic attorney disciplinary rules prohibit deceitful behavior and 
reliance on false or misleading evidence, and prosecutors are required by 
such rules to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence.  “The 
Grievance Committee and the Appellate Division regularly sanction 
attorneys for mere negligence in handling client funds and other client 
matters,” Su wrote.214
 
 207. Letter from Shih Wei Su to Melissa D. Broder, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. State 
Grievance Comm. for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists. (Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
  Observing that the prosecutor had “cost me 13 years 
of my life,” Su continued, “[e]ven intentional misconduct in such matters 
 208. Letter from Jerome Karp to Melissa D. Broder, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. State 
Grievance Comm. for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists. (Dec. 12, 2003) (on file with 
author); Dwyer, supra note 206, at A27.  This letter was quoted in Mr. Dwyer’s article, was 
the subject of questioning during the prosecutor’s deposition in Su’s civil rights case, and 
was introduced as an exhibit. 
 209. Letter from Jerome Karp to Melissa D. Broder, supra note 208. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Letter from Shih Wei Su to Melissa D. Broder, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. State 
Grievance Comm. for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists. (Jan. 22, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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pales in importance compared to the damage done by a public prosecutor 
who knowingly withholds exculpatory evidence or misleads the court or the 
defense.”215
Su did not hear at all from the Committee, until he received a seven-line 
letter from Chief Counsel Diana Maxfield Kearse over a year later.  It 
informed Su that, on December 14, 2004, “all the facts pertaining to your 
complaint were presented to the Grievance Committee,” and it had taken 
“appropriate action”:  “the attorney has been issued an Admonition and a 
permanent record has been made.”
  He asked for permission to participate in the proceedings 
regarding the prosecutor. 
216  An “admonition” is the lightest 
sanction that may be imposed in New York, and does not result in any 
public record.217
On February 28, Su wrote Ms. Kearse, asking what “investigation,” if 
any, had been conducted.
 
218  “Was [the prosecutor]’s unbelievable defense 
that she was unaware of her obligation to correct testimony she knew to be 
false challenged in any way? . . .  What was the Committee’s reasoning in 
concluding that knowing misconduct by an experienced prosecutor (four 
years in the Office!) resulting in a wrongful conviction and 13 years 
imprisonment merited only an Admonition?”219  Su requested the 
opportunity to present his case to the full Committee.220
Assistant Counsel Melissa D. Broder responded on March 22, 2005.  
There is no procedure to appeal a sanction, she wrote.  Su was “free to 
consult with counsel regarding any civil remedies which may be available 
to you regarding the above-named attorney.”
 
221
 Even jaywalking can get prison time.  So can stealing a loaf of bread.  
How is it possible that an experienced prosecutor who knowingly broke 
every bar association code, every Constitutional law, and more only gets 
an admonition? 
  Su still did not give up.  
On March 30, he again wrote Chief Counsel Kearse: 
 I am not a lawyer . . . but I guarantee you that any person, no matter 
how “naive, inexperience[d], or possibly stupid,” will know that false 
evidence is not allowed in the court. 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Letter from Diana Maxfield Kearse, Chief Counsel, N.Y. State Grievance Comm. for 
the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists., to Shih Wei Su (Feb. 3, 2005) (on file with author). 
 217. See Appellate Div. Second Judicial Dep’t, Attorney Matters:  How to Make a 
Complaint About a Lawyer, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/attorneymatters_
ComplaintAboutaLawyer.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2011), (“An Admonition is issued in 
those cases in which the committee finds that the lawyer committed clear professional 
misconduct that was not sufficiently serious to warrant the commencement of a formal 
disciplinary proceeding.”). 
 218. Letter from Shih Wei Su to Diana Maxfield Kearse, Chief Counsel, N.Y. State 
Grievance Comm. for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists. (Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Letter from Melissa D. Broder, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. State Grievance Comm. for 
the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists., to Shih Wei Su (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with author). 
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 With all due respect, the message that this committee is sending out is 
loud and clear:  Don’t worry about using false evidence; you will only get 
an admonition if you are stupid enough to admit it.222
On April 26, 2005, Broder curtly reminded Su that “this matter is closed” 
and that he could consult with counsel regarding “civil remedies . . . .  This 
should conclude our correspondences regarding this matter.”
 
223
 3.  The Civil Lawsuit 
 
On February 16, 2006, Su took up the Grievance Committee’s 
suggestion.  He filed suit against the City of New York in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking monetary 
damages pursuant to § 1983 for his wrongful conviction.224  His lawsuit, 
modeled after the Ramos and Walker cases, contended that the prosecutor’s 
misconduct had resulted from the deliberate indifference of the Queens 
District Attorney to his obligation to properly train, supervise, and 
discipline his staff regarding their Brady and related due process 
obligations.225  Su attached to his complaint an exhibit listing twenty-eight 
cases, decided between 1985 and 2004, involving wrongful withholding of 
evidence by Queens prosecutors, and fifty-nine cases in which such 
prosecutors during the same time frame relied on false, misleading, or 
inflammatory evidence or argument.226
During discovery proceedings, the court directed the City to provide 
personnel and disciplinary records (if any) for prosecutors involved in 
seventy-three appellate reversals for such misconduct, during the thirteen-
year period from 1985 through 1998, including twenty-five cases involving 
the withholding of material evidence.  When disclosed, the records did not 
reveal a single instance through 2000 in which any prosecutor had been 
disciplined by way of dismissal, suspension, demotion, transfer, reduction 
in or withholding of compensation, negative written evaluation, or referral 
to the court’s Grievance Committee, for any of the seventy-three cases.
 
227
 
 222. Letter from Shih Wei Su to Diana Maxfield Kearse, Chief Counsel, NYS Grievance 
Comm. for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists. (Mar. 30, 2005) (on file with author). 
  
Discovery materials showed that, as in the Bronx, the Queens District 
Attorney’s Office had (and has) no published or formal code of conduct for 
prosecutors, or any formal disciplinary policies or procedures.  The 
informal “procedure” was for the Chief of Appeals, whenever a motion or 
brief was received that caused him to be “concerned” about possible 
misconduct, to bring the matter to the attention of the Chief Assistant 
 223. Letter from Melissa D. Broder, Assistant Counsel, NYS Grievance Comm. for the 
Second & Eleventh Judicial Dists., to Shih Wei Su (Apr. 26, 2005) (on file with author). 
 224. Complaint, supra note 185, at 1. 
 225. See id. at 12–15. 
 226. See id. at Ex. B. 
 227. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 
(E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 16, 2006) (on filed with author).  As with the Bronx District Attorney’s 
Office, names of the line prosecutors apparently involved in misconduct have been omitted, 
as they are unnecessary for the purposes of this Article. 
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District Attorney or District Attorney Richard Brown.228  Trial bureau 
supervisors might also report concerns up the chain of command.229  Also, 
the District Attorney would receive copies of appellate decisions.230  If the 
District Attorney concluded that a verbal reprimand was in order, he would 
handwrite a note to the Chief Assistant District Attorney, John Ryan, to 
“speak to” the Assistant District Attorney involved.231  However, only three 
such notes were produced,232 neither Castellano nor Testagrossa knew of 
any Assistant District Attorney who actually had been “spoken to,”233 and 
there was no such evidence in any prosecutor’s personnel file234
Assistant District Attorney Claude Stuart was caught apparently lying to 
a state court judge about whether an exculpatory witness was available to 
come to court to testify, and his alleged misconduct was reported in the 
news media.
—with one 
exception. 
235  The Disciplinary Committee ultimately suspended him 
from practice and he was fired by the District Attorney’s Office.236  This 
fiasco might never have occurred had the Office disciplined Stuart when he 
previously was exposed for alleged misconduct.  In 1995, Stuart had 
obtained a conviction in People v. Walters237 by arguing in summation that 
the defendant had committed a shooting with a gun recovered from him 
which Stuart knew had not been used in the crime.238  The appellate court 
reversed the conviction, finding Stuart’s conduct “an abrogation of his 
responsibility as a prosecutor,” “egregious,” and “improper.”239  The 
District Attorney’s Chief of Appeals, John Castellano, testified in his 
deposition that he told the Chief Assistant District Attorney, John Ryan, 
that Stuart’s conduct had been “not tolerable” and “inexcusable.”240  
However, Castellano was unaware if Stuart had been disciplined for that 
misconduct, and there was no discovery suggesting that he had been.241
The deposition of Su’s prosecutor provided an interesting insight into the 
Office’s attitude regarding Brady compliance.  While she acknowledged 
that her failure to disclose the truth about Jeffrey Tom’s relationship with 
the Office had been inexcusable, she revealed that it had been consistent 
with her training to erect a “Chinese wall” in order to avoid obtaining 
 
 
 228. Deposition of John Castellano at 22–23, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 
(E.D.N.Y. deposed May 29, 2008) (on file with author). 
 229. Deposition of Charles Testagrossa at 19, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 
(E.D.N.Y. deposed June 11, 2008) (on file with author). 
 230. Id. at 27. 
 231. Deposition of John Castellano, supra note 228, at 257–58. 
 232. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 227. 
 233. See Deposition of Charles Testagrossa, supra note 229, at 19; Deposition of John 
Castellano, supra note 228, at 257–58. 
 234. Personnel records disclosed in discovery, supra note 227. 
 235. Stacy Albin, Queens:  Murder Conviction Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, 
at B12. 
 236. In re Stuart, 803 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 2005). 
 237. 674 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 1998). 
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knowledge of deals other prosecutors in the Office had made with 
cooperating witnesses.242  This policy was inconsistent with Ethical 
Consideration 7-13 of the New York State Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which prohibited prosecutors from consciously avoiding 
knowledge they are required to disclose to their adversaries.243
The Chinese wall policy was exposed and condemned in People v. 
Steadman,
 
244 even before Su’s case was tried.  In Steadman, the New York 
Court of Appeals blasted the Queens District Attorney’s unlawful policy, 
promulgated at an executive level, to erect just such a Chinese wall between 
trial prosecutors utilizing a cooperating witness and the prosecutor making 
a deal with the witness.245  The Office’s Chief of Trials, Daniel McCarthy, 
had made the deal with a witness’s attorney, knowing that the witness 
would later invoke attorney-client privilege to shield himself from cross-
examination when he falsely denied knowledge of promised benefits.246  
The trial prosecutors had kept themselves ignorant of the discussions, and 
had done nothing to correct the witness’s false or misleading denial of 
knowledge of any promises.247  After the witness’s attorney, as an act of 
conscience, had disclosed the scheme to the defense and it had been 
denounced in a scathing opinion by the trial judge (issued before Su’s 
trial),248 the Office defended it on appeal as lawful, and promoted one of 
the two line prosecutors to a supervisory position.249  This prosecutor was 
not even chastised for his behavior in the case.250  Meanwhile, Chief of 
Trials McCarthy was hired by Bronx District Attorney Johnson to become 
his Director of Trial Training.251  In his deposition, Johnson denied having 
ever been aware of Steadman, before or after hiring McCarthy,252 even 
though McCarthy’s misconduct had been denounced in written opinions by 
the trial judge, the Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals.  The 
Queens District Attorney conducted no internal investigation.253
 
 242. Deposition of Su’s Prosecutor at 39–41, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 
(E.D.N.Y. deposed June 19, 2008) (on file with author). 
 
 243. See New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13, available at 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/ProfessionalStandardsforAttor
neys/LawyersCodeDec2807.pdf (“[A] prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of 
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time of Su’s prosecution. 
 244. 82 N.Y.2d 1 (1993). 
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 249. See Deposition of Jack Warsawsky at 12, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 
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 250. See id. at 135–36. 
 251. Deposition of Daniel McCarthy at 9, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 
deposed Aug. 11, 2008) (on file with author).   
 252. Deposition of Robert Johnson, supra note 167, at 76–78. 
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Su’s prosecutor’s behavior in failing to disclose the truth about the 
Jeffrey Tom deal should have been known internally for years, but the 
Office was indifferent to it.  Prosecutors assigned to oppose Su’s direct 
appeal and collateral attacks on his conviction acknowledged that they had 
an ongoing Brady obligation to investigate whether Su’s Brady allegations 
were correct, but they never did so.  When one such Assistant District 
Attorney attempted to question Su’s trial prosecutor, the latter refused to 
cooperate, and no one in the Appeals Bureau brought this remarkable and 
intolerable stonewalling to the attention of executives in the Office.254  
After Su filed his federal habeas petition, Chief of Appeals Castellano 
questioned Su’s prosecutor, who claimed not to recall why she had not 
corrected Tom’s false testimony, and Castellano conducted no further 
investigation into her behavior before preparing opposition papers.255  In 
2003, shortly after she had left the Office, Su’s prosecutor learned from a 
news report that the Second Circuit had vacated Su’s conviction, and 
telephoned John Ryan, the District Attorney’s long-time Chief Assistant, to 
complain.  Ryan responded:  “[Y]ou are just going to have a bad day, that’s 
all.”256  Another high-level prosecutor in the Office told her, “Don’t worry, 
you’re a good attorney.  Everything will work out.”257
In another case resulting in federal habeas relief and strong condemnation 
of the prosecutor’s conduct, there was no internal discipline but instead the 
prosecutor was promoted.  In Jenkins v. Artuz,
 
258 a federal judge, granting 
habeas relief, found that the prosecutor had “engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct that was designed to conceal the existence of [a witness’s] 
cooperation agreement during [Jenkins’s] trial,”259 and that this misconduct 
was “improper and, when considered cumulatively, severe.”260  Refusing to 
admit error, the District Attorney’s Office appealed.  The Second Circuit 
affirmed the District Court’s issuance of the writ, holding that the 
prosecutor “misled the jury,” both in her questioning of the cooperating 
witness and during her summation,261 and that “no doubt . . . [this] behavior 
violated Jenkins’s due process rights.”262  Deposition testimony and other 
discovery revealed that the Queens District Attorney did not even 
informally admonish the prosecutor.263  She received a promotion not long 
after Jenkins was convicted and currently is a Deputy Chief in one of the 
Queens District Attorney’s Office’s trial bureaus.264
 
 254. Deposition of Ranjana Piplani at 24–26, Su v. City of New York, 06 Civ. 687 
(E.D.N.Y. deposed May 22, 2008) (on file with author). 
  Numerous additional 
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decisions used strong language in condemning what the courts sometimes 
concluded was intentional misconduct,265
While no records were kept of complaints, findings of misconduct, or 
alleged reprimands, the contrary was true when it came to success in 
obtaining convictions.  Charles Testagrossa, Executive Assistant District 
Attorney in charge of the Major Crimes Division in 2008 and an executive 
at the office for nearly twenty years, testified at his deposition that Assistant 
District Attorneys and their supervisors, under previous and the present 
District Attorneys, kept track of their trial win-loss records.
 but records reflected no internal 
sanctions. 
266  He said he 
perceived that their victory percentage affected their promotions and 
compensation.267
As discovery in the Su case neared completion, the City strenuously 
opposed the plaintiff’s efforts to depose the District Attorney, Richard 
Brown, and his chief assistant, John Ryan, concerning their Brady 
disclosure and disciplinary policies.  After the court directed Ryan to 
submit to a deposition and held open the possibility that Brown could be 
deposed as well, the parties reached a $3.5 million settlement. 
 
C.  Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office:  The Zahrey Case 
1.  Criminal Proceedings 
Zaher Zahrey was an undercover narcotics detective for the New York 
City Police Department’s Brooklyn North narcotics division with an 
excellent performance record when he fell under investigation by the 
NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) in 1994.268
 
 265. See, e.g., People v. Ni, 742 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (App. Div. 2002) (“[I]nstances of 
prosecutorial misconduct were flagrant.”); People v. Mackey, 670 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (App. 
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on cross-examination.”); People v. Elder, 615 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (App. Div. 1998) (finding 
that prosecutor’s improper summation comments were “flagrant”); People v. Scott, 629 
N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (App. Div. 1995) (finding “flagrant” and “pervasive” prosecutorial 
misconduct); People v. Robinson, 594 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802–03 (App. Div. 1993) (noting that 
prosecutor’s improper trial tactics and summation comments were “continued” and 
“persistent”); People v. Gomez, 548 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (App. Div. 1989) (reversing 
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v. Perez, 511 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (App. Div. 1987) (finding that prosecutor made a 
“deliberate attempt to mislead the jury”).  In other cases, the appellate courts criticized 
prosecutors’ conduct as reckless or negligent. See, e.g., People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 621 
(1992) (criticizing “the People’s seeming lack of care in discharging their discovery 
obligation”). 
  IAB had been 
reconstituted to more vigorously combat police corruption after highly-
 266. See Deposition of Charles Testagrossa, supra note 229, at 44–45. 
 267. See id. at 46. 
 268. Fifth Amended Complaint at 11, 14, Zahrey v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4546 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 23, 2004) (on file with author). See generally Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 
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publicized hearings had exposed the department’s lethargy in that regard.269  
Zahrey was suspected because he had continued playing playground “pick-
up” basketball games with several individuals whom the police believed 
had been involved in criminal activity, including a local basketball legend 
and childhood friend, William Rivera.270  When Rivera was murdered, 
Zahrey came forward to try to assist Rivera’s family in finding out the 
status of the homicide investigation, only to walk into a hornet’s nest of 
IAB detectives who were on the case because the murder weapon had been 
an off-duty police officer’s gun.271
An intensive, two-year investigation yielded just one witness—a crack-
addicted career criminal named Sidney Quick—who claimed knowledge 
that Zahrey had committed crimes.
 
272  At the direction of the Brooklyn 
District Attorney’s Office, IAB Detective-Sergeant Robert Boyce 
repeatedly interviewed Quick, obtaining bizarrely inconsistent accusations 
that Zahrey had provided Rivera’s alleged hold-up crew with confidential 
Police Department information on drug spots that could be robbed.273  
When these interviews led nowhere, Boyce later traveled to Sing-Sing State 
Prison, where Quick was by then serving a six-to-life sentence for 
robbery.274  Remarkably, Boyce tape-recorded the entire, two-hour 
interview in which he promised Quick “a very sweet deal” in exchange for 
his cooperation against Zahrey, and suggested a story to Quick, which was 
demonstrably false, implicating Zahrey in the attempted robbery and 
murder of a drug dealer.275  Brooklyn prosecutors who heard the tape tried 
for nearly two years to develop corroboration for Quick’s accusations, a 
necessary prerequisite for prosecution under New York State law, but when 
they were unable to do so, they convinced federal authorities (who were not 
legally required to obtain corroboration) to take over the case and to 
prosecute—without initially disclosing the Quick tape and other 
exculpatory and impeaching information.276  Zahrey was held for nearly 
nine months without bail, pending the conclusion of federal trial 
proceedings.277  After a six-week trial, at which the author represented him, 
he was fully acquitted in June 1997.278
2.  Civil Proceedings 
 
In 1998, Zahrey brought a lawsuit against various individual prosecutors 
and detectives for investigative misconduct, and against the City of New 
 
 269. Craig Horowitz, A Cop’s Tale, N.Y. MAG., July 16, 2001, at 32 (explaining that the 
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York.279  One of his claims was that the indifference of Brooklyn District 
Attorney Charles J. Hynes to violations of the Office’s Brady and related 
due process obligations had caused the Office’s line prosecutors 
investigating the matter to withhold exculpatory information from the 
United States Attorney’s Office, while simultaneously urging that Office to 
initiate Zahrey’s prosecution.280  The Brady claim was ultimately 
dismissed,281 but before settling,282
In a deposition held on October 18, 2005, Dino G. Amoroso, former 
Counsel to the District Attorney, and then Executive Assistant District 
Attorney, testified that he was responsible for implementing Hynes’ 
policies to ensure compliance with ethical standards and was 
knowledgeable about any specific investigations of prosecutors for alleged 
misconduct since Hynes’ tenure began in 1990.
 Zahrey succeeded in obtaining 
considerable discovery showing that the Brooklyn District Attorney’s 
Office, like its counterparts in Queens and the Bronx, has no formal 
disciplinary rules and procedures, and no history of disciplining prosecutors 
found to have engaged in misconduct, including the withholding of Brady 
material. 
283  The Office had no 
employee manual or other published rules or procedures concerning 
standards of behavior, potential sanctions for violating them, or procedures 
for investigating and imposing discipline, including with regard to Brady 
obligations.284  The Office would distribute memoranda on discovery and 
Brady obligations, but had no follow-up procedure to make sure individual 
prosecutors read them, and no Brady “policy.”285  Prosecutors were told 
informally that “conscious” ethical violations, including under Brady, 
would have the “highest consequence,” including dismissal from the 
Office—as opposed to inadvertent mistakes during the “hurly-burly of 
trials.”286
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  Consistent with that approach, while it was conceivable that a 
 280. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 268, at 65–66. 
 281. Zahrey v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4546, 2009 WL 54495, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 7, 2009) (reasoning that Zahrey had not been prejudiced by any Brady violations since 
he was acquitted at trial, but holding that Brooklyn prosecutors were subject to personal 
liability for their involvement in manufacturing and using evidence they knew had been 
manufactured to cause federal criminal proceedings to be initiated and continued against 
Zahrey). 
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prosecutor might deserve sanction for merely violating Brady “negligently,” 
ordinarily only intentional misconduct would be punished.287 
Amoroso testified that when a complaint or court decision was received 
identifying a possible ethical issue, it would be brought to the attention of 
the District Attorney, who would decide whether an investigation should be 
conducted or whether any other action was necessary.288  Amoroso was 
fully informed about all such investigations that were conducted from 1990 
to 2005.  While he initially claimed that several disciplinary inquiries were 
conducted, he then acknowledged that none of them were for the purpose of 
determining whether a prosecutor had engaged in ethical lapses during the 
handling of criminal prosecutions.  Rather, the investigations either were 
into personal misconduct by Assistant District Attorneys having nothing to 
do with their handling of individual cases, or concerned whether to retry 
defendants whose convictions had been reversed or vacated.289  He did not 
know of a single instance in which any prosecutor had been so much as 
admonished for misconduct related to his or her handling of a criminal 
investigation or prosecution.290 
During this fifteen-year period, however, there were numerous court 
decisions finding serious misbehavior by Brooklyn prosecutors, including 
in the Brady context.  These cases included instances where Assistant 
District Attorneys withheld exculpatory witness statements or impeachment 
material, or made false and/or misleading presentations of the evidence at 
trial.291  Numerous additional instances of misconduct through the present 
day were identified in the complaint in Collins v. City of New York, a 
lawsuit the author recently filed based upon findings by a federal judge of 
pervasive Brady violations, witness coercion, and other misconduct by the 
Chief of District Attorney Hynes’ Rackets Division, Michael F. 
Vecchione.292  In the highly publicized Jabbar Collins murder case, 
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Hynes’s office agreed to federal habeas corpus relief for Collins,293  his 
immediate release after fifteen years in prison, and the dismissal of the 
indictment without retrial,294 rather than have Vecchione, the Office’s chief 
“anti-corruption” prosecutor,295 and other prosecutors in the Office, testify 
at a habeas hearing ordered by Federal District Judge Dora Irizarry.296  The 
Office admitted that it had failed to disclose a secret recantation by its chief 
witness,297 a recantation that Vecchione, in a previous sworn affidavit, had 
categorically denied ever occurred.298  In testimony that the federal court 
found “credible,” a second key witness testified that he was a drug addict at 
the time he was questioned by Vecchione, and that Vecchione threatened 
him with physical harm and secretly incarcerated him for a week without 
following required material witness procedures.299  The court characterized 
the prosecution’s failure to disclose this information, along with additional 
evidence refuting the testimony of the third and final significant prosecution 
trial witness, as “shameful.”300  Immediately after Judge Irizarry made her 
denunciation of Vecchione’s behavior and the conduct of the Office, Hynes 
ratified that behavior.  He told the news media that he would conduct no 
investigation, praised Vecchione as “a very, very principled lawyer,”301 and 
pronounced him “not guilty of any misconduct.”302  Collins’s lawsuit 
contends that Vecchione’s behavior did not simply result from Hynes’s 
indifference to coercion of witnesses and Brady violations but that such 
misconduct, at least in high-profile cases that the Office was anxious to 
win, was the policy of the Office. 303
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CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumption in Imbler and in subsequent 
decisions, experience shows that prosecutors are not disciplined—either 
internally by their Offices or externally by court or bar disciplinary 
committees—for violating their Brady or other due process obligations 
during criminal proceedings.  Three major District Attorneys’ Offices in 
“progressive” New York City lack any formal disciplinary rules or 
procedures, despite being large organizations employing hundreds of 
prosecutors and support staff.304  Their informal “policy” is to confine 
consideration of discipline to cases in which courts have found 
“intentional” or willful misbehavior, even though courts often do not reach 
the issue of willfulness as it may be irrelevant to whether there was a 
violation of the defendant’s due process rights requiring reversal of the 
conviction.  In the relatively few Brady or other cases in which the court 
has found willfulness, the District Attorneys avoid discipline by rejecting 
the court’s conclusion, or just passively failing to follow up with any 
investigation or consideration of discipline.305
In future cases, when analyzing policy considerations relating to 
individual and municipal liability by prosecutors or their employers for 
violations of the constitutional rights of criminal suspects or defendants, the 
Supreme Court should abandon the false assumption that prosecutors, 
theoretically subject to professional codes, really are disciplined or have 
reason to fear being disciplined by their offices or by outside disciplinary 
bodies.  Otherwise, the Court will continue to premise significant civil 
rights decisions on a fiction that has plagued constitutional jurisprudence 
for thirty-five years. 
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